Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth

DOI10.1007/S00712-015-0464-2MaRDI QIDQ1654080zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors João Correia-da-Silva, Joana Pinho, Helder Vasconcelos

Publication date 7 August 2018

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0464-2

zbMATH Keywords

collusionentrymarket growth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites work

• Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars During Booms
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model

Cited in

(5)

• Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization
• The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy
• When does predation dominate collusion?
• Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry
• Losses from horizontal merger and collusion

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