Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization
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Publication:1616611
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Cites work
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Competition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approach
- Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly model
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
- Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firm's moves: the relevance of privatization
- Presence of foreign investors in privatized firms and privatization policy
- State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation
- Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth
Cited in
(7)- Mixed oligopoly, privatization, subsidization, and the order of firms' moves: several types of objectives
- Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon
- A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries
- Mixed oligopolies and collusion
- On competition and welfare enhancing policies in a mixed oligopoly
- Will managerial delegation impede upstream collusion?
- Partial privatization in an international mixed oligopoly under product differentiation
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