State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation

DOI10.1007/S00712-007-0286-YzbMATH Open1133.91371OpenAlexW1971165888MaRDI QIDQ2476005FDOQ2476005

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 11 March 2008

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0286-y

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zbMATH Keywords

entryregulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
• Politicians and Firms

Cited In (12)

• Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization
• What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets?
• Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry
• Privatization and efficiency: a mixed oligopoly approach
• Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?
• The efficiency of the state-owned firm and social welfare: a note
• Partial privatization in an exhaustible resource industry
• Product differentiation, privatization commitment and profitability comparisons
• Ownership and pricing response to entry
• Do state-owned enterprises influence technological development?
• Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization
• Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly

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