State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2476005
DOI10.1007/s00712-007-0286-yzbMath1133.91371OpenAlexW1971165888MaRDI QIDQ2476005
Publication date: 11 March 2008
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0286-y
Related Items
Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization ⋮ Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry ⋮ Product differentiation, privatization commitment and profitability comparisons ⋮ Partial privatization in an exhaustible resource industry ⋮ Privatization and efficiency: a mixed oligopoly approach ⋮ Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly ⋮ What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets? ⋮ Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization ⋮ Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation
