The efficiency of the state-owned firm and social welfare: a note

DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2010.00386.XMaRDI QIDQ4899992zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Susumu Cato

Publication date 10 January 2013

Published in Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00386.x

zbMATH Keywords

mixed marketstate-owned firmtechnological efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Privatization and efficiency: a mixed oligopoly approach
• State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation
• Research on the privatization policy-taking the mixed duopoly industry as the example
• Market competition, social welfare in an entry-constrained differentiated-good oligopoly
• Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition

Cites work

• Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare
• Imperfect competition and the Keynesian cross
• Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
• Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization

Cited in

(2)

• Leaders and competitors
• Ratio-Lindahl and ratio equilibria with many goods

This page was built for publication: The efficiency of the state-owned firm and social welfare: a note

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4899992)