Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?
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Publication:972727
DOI10.1007/s00712-010-0117-4zbMath1229.91185OpenAlexW2115396046MaRDI QIDQ972727
Tai-Liang Chen, Leonard F. S. Wang
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0117-4
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items
Foreign competition and optimal privatization with excess burden of taxation ⋮ Product differentiation, privatization commitment and profitability comparisons ⋮ Competition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approach ⋮ Comparison between specific taxation and volume quotas in a free entry Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Privatization and efficiency: a mixed oligopoly approach ⋮ Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly ⋮ Optimal partial privatization in an endogenous timing game: a mixed oligopoly approach ⋮ What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets? ⋮ Optimal degree of privatization and the environmental problem ⋮ Optimal manipulation rules in a mixed oligopoly ⋮ Presence of foreign investors in privatized firms and privatization policy ⋮ Partial privatization in an international mixed oligopoly under product differentiation ⋮ Free entry in mixed oligopoly leads to insufficient privatization? ⋮ Corporate social responsibility and privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly ⋮ Privatization neutrality theorem in free entry markets
Cites Work
- Merger profitability in mixed oligopoly
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
- Mixed duopoly, merger and multiproduct firms
- Mixed oligopoly at free entry markets
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: another forgotten equilibrium
- Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with foreign competitors: the linear demand case
- State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation
