Politicians and Firms

DOI10.2307/2118354zbMath0826.90074OpenAlexW2030132760WikidataQ61603176 ScholiaQ61603176MaRDI QIDQ4834432

Robert W. Vishny, Andrei Shleifer

Publication date: 30 May 1995

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2118354

zbMATH Keywords

privatizationcommercializationbargaining between politicians and managers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (12)

When do privatizations have popular support? A voting model ⋮ Optimal privatization portfolios in the presence of arbitrary risk aversion ⋮ Bargaining: Nash, consensus, or compromise? ⋮ Association between foreign background of executives and firm goodwill impairment risk ⋮ Politically connected firms and the environment ⋮ Economic growth and property rights on natural resources ⋮ REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT, POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA ⋮ State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation ⋮ Power, growth, and the voracity effect ⋮ How does government ownership affect firm performance? A simple model of privatization in transition economies ⋮ Insider control and the soft budget constraint: A simple theory ⋮ Reputation and the ``need for enemies

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