When do privatizations have popular support? A voting model

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102633zbMath1490.91125OpenAlexW4206326330MaRDI QIDQ2138375

Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, Didier Laussel

Publication date: 11 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102633

zbMATH Keywords

democracygeneral equilibriumprivatizationpublic monopolymajority votevertical preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

On the political economy of economic integration

Cites Work

• Privatization neutrality theorem revisited
• When do imperfectly competitive firms maximize profits? The lessons from a simple general equilibrium model with shareholders' voting
• Politicians and Firms

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