Reputation and the ``need for enemies

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01289-7MaRDI QIDQ2074052zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maxime Menuet, Patrick Villieu

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://hal.uca.fr/hal-02876593/file/need_11%20%281%29.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

transparencypolitical economycareer concernsneed for enemies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Reputation from nested activities
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Cites work

• A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
• Bad Reputation
• Deficit, monetization, and economic growth: a case for multiplicity and indeterminacy
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Mixed up? That's good for motivation
• On the efficiency of markets for managers
• Politicians and Firms
• Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
• Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired
• When is reputation bad?

Cited in

(3)

• Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?
• Conspicuous conservatism in risk choice
• Mixed up? That's good for motivation

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