Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01509-2zbMATH Open1546.91174MaRDI QIDQ6580467FDOQ6580467

Authors: Maxime Menuet, Hugo Oriola, Patrick Villieu 

Publication date: 29 July 2024

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix
• The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Monetary Policy
• Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
• Does public debt secure social peace? A diversionary theory of public debt management
• Reputation and the ``need for enemies

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