Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01509-2MaRDI QIDQ6580467zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Maxime Menuet, Hugo Oriola, Patrick Villieu

Publication date 29 July 2024

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• A CENTRAL BANK FOR ALL SEASONS? THE LOWER INFLATION AT NO COST PROPOSITION UNDER CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
• Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited
• Rogoff revisited: The conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies
• Might a conservative central banker reduce employment variability?
• Restoring the conservative central banker proposition under monetary-fiscal interaction

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2199188 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix
• Does public debt secure social peace? A diversionary theory of public debt management
• Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
• Reputation and the ``need for enemies
• The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Monetary Policy

This page was built for publication: Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6580467)