Might a conservative central banker reduce employment variability?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.06.012MaRDI QIDQ1929484zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan G. James, Phillip Lawler

Publication date 8 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.012

zbMATH Keywords

central bankeremployment variabilityunion wage setting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites work

• Central bank inflation contracts and strategic wage setting in a multiunion economy

Cited in

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• Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?
• Monetary accommodation and unemployment: why central bank transparency matters
• Supply shocks, private sector information and monetary policy: is there inevitably a stabilization trade-off?
• Monetary uncertainty, strategic wage setting and equilibrium employment
• Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
• Are Employment Policies Counterproductive when Wage Setting Is Centralized?

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