The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00085MaRDI QIDQ4262870zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mathias Dewatripont, Ian Jewitt, Jean Tirole

Publication date 4 June 2000

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00085

zbMATH Keywords

fuzzy missionsmultiple missionsmultitask career concern model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

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