A theory of political cycles

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.10.006MaRDI QIDQ1017789zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leonardo Conegundes Martinez

Publication date 12 May 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

electionsreputationdynamic gamesagencycareer concernspolitical cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
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Cites work

• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Strategic Promotion and Compensation
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Cited in

(10)

• Political dynamics affected by turncoats
• A theory of political and economic cycles
• Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model
• Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
• Political Cycles and Cyclical Policies
• Private agenda and re-election incentives
• Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
• Markovian strategies with continuous and impulse controls for a differential game model of revolution
• Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency
• A Quantitative Theory of Political Transitions

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