Political accountability: A stochastic control approach
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04023-8_15zbMATH Open1189.37116OpenAlexW1848871769MaRDI QIDQ3569486FDOQ3569486
Authors: Michele Longo, Alessandra Mainini 
Publication date: 21 June 2010
Published in: Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics, Finance and Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04023-8_15
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- Political Centralization and Government Accountability *
- Endogenous political competition and political accountability
- A theory of political cycles
- Private agenda and re-election incentives
- A structural model of electoral accountability
- Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives
- Electoral control and the human capital of politicians
- Comparative analysis of Politician-bureaucratic governance structure and citizens' preference
- Self-enforcing democracy
- Electoral competition, incentive contracts for politicians and unknown preferences
- The emergence of political accountability
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