Electoral competition, incentive contracts for politicians and unknown preferences

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0218-3MaRDI QIDQ2467523zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Verena Liessem

Publication date 22 January 2008

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0218-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Redesigning Democracy
• Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Cited in

(9)

• Reelection threshold contracts in politics
• The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises
• Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
• Electoral competition under costly policy implementation
• Private agenda and re-election incentives
• Political accountability: A stochastic control approach
• Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives
• Competition of politicians for wages and office
• On the optimality of policy choices in the face of biased beliefs, retrospective voting and the down-up problem

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