Reelection threshold contracts in politics

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0277-5MaRDI QIDQ1024768zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Verena Liessem

Publication date 17 June 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/3661

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Electoral competition, incentive contracts for politicians and unknown preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4167668 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal retention in agency problems
• Redesigning Democracy

Cited in

(5)

• Electoral competition, incentive contracts for politicians and unknown preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5997456 (Why is no real title available?)
• Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices
• Multiple tasks and political organization
• Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation

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