Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices

DOI10.1111/SJOE.12175MaRDI QIDQ4683553zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matías Núñez, Dimitrios Xefteris

Publication date 21 September 2018

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12175

zbMATH Keywords

entry thresholdPoisson gamesstrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(1)

• Reelection threshold contracts in politics

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