Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation

DOI10.1007/BF02204849MaRDI QIDQ2276853zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sven Berg, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date 1990

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02204849

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet paradoxexistence of cyclesplurality rulestrategic manipulationstrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

Under plurality rule it is shown that there exists a strong connection between strategic manipulation and the existence of cycles. This result allows the authors to evaluate the vulnerability of plurality rule to strategic voting and to study the effect of different assumptions on the distribution of voters on the risk of manipulation.

Recommendations

• Strategic voting under the plurality rule without the common knowledge assumption
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
• Strategic voting and nomination

Cites work

• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule

Cited in

(11)

• Strategic voting in repeated referenda
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
• Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting
• The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting
• Cycles and chaos in political party voting—a research note
• Strategic voting under the plurality rule without the common knowledge assumption
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices
• On probability models in voting theory
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures

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