Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation (Q2276853)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4193409
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| English | Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4193409 |
Statements
Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation (English)
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1990
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Under plurality rule it is shown that there exists a strong connection between strategic manipulation and the existence of cycles. This result allows the authors to evaluate the vulnerability of plurality rule to strategic voting and to study the effect of different assumptions on the distribution of voters on the risk of manipulation.
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Condorcet paradox
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plurality rule
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strategic manipulation
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existence of cycles
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strategic voting
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0.8365179300308228
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0.8200162649154663
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0.8042775988578796
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0.7989521026611328
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0.7950845956802368
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