Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes

DOI10.2307/2296596zbMATH Open0364.90005OpenAlexW2082073996MaRDI QIDQ4139910FDOQ4139910

Authors: Prasanta K. Pattanaik 

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296596

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cited In (10)

• Implementation by mediated equilibrium
• Stable voting schemes
• Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation
• Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
• Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions

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