Gains from manipulating social choice rules

DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0380-6MaRDI QIDQ2391056zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 24 July 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0380-6

zbMATH Keywords

scoring rulesmanipulationcoringGibbard-Satterthwaite

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(13)

• Social Choice Theory
• Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• The structure of unstable power mechanisms
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
• The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity

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