Cites work
- A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
- The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
- Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
Cited in
(13)- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
- Social Choice Theory
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
- Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
- Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
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