Gains from manipulating social choice rules
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Publication:2391056
DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0380-6zbMATH Open1173.91361OpenAlexW2146235467MaRDI QIDQ2391056FDOQ2391056
Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly 
Publication date: 24 July 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0380-6
Cites Work
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Cited In (13)
- Social Choice Theory
- Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity
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