Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
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Publication:431230
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0562-xzbMath1253.91154OpenAlexW2016842189MaRDI QIDQ431230
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0562-x
coremarket designproportional rulemanipulation gamenearly robustness to strategic manipulationNIMBY (not in my backyard)
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Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model ⋮ On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility ⋮ Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval ⋮ A new approach to agglomeration problems
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