Effective siting of waste treatment facilities

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1180MaRDI QIDQ697512zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Deborah Minehart, Zvika Neeman

Publication date 17 September 2002

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1180

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionswaste treatmenthazardous wasteLULUNIMBY

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Outcomes of bargaining and planning in single facility location problems
• Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
• Locating a low-level waste disposal site
• Fair share: Siting noxious facilities as a risk distribution game under nontransferable utility

Cited in

(7)

• Fair share: Siting noxious facilities as a risk distribution game under nontransferable utility
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Choosing and sharing
• Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility
• Siting noxious facilities: efficiency and majority rule decisions

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