Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

DOI10.1007/S10058-006-0018-8MaRDI QIDQ2644688zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Denis Lescop

Publication date 3 September 2007

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0018-8

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsBayesian equilibriumclub goodexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Effective siting of waste treatment facilities
• Mechanism design for locating a facility under partial information
• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Mechanism Design for One-Facility Location Game with Obnoxious Effects

Cites work

• Auctioning the provision of an indivisible public good
• Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Auction Design
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions

Cited in

(8)

• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model
• Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval
• On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
• Single-basined choice
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
• Effective siting of waste treatment facilities

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