Incentives in Teams
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer
- Strongly polynomial-time truthful mechanisms in one shot
- A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms
- Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Multiscale decision-making: bridging organizational scales in systems with distributed decision-makers
- Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
- Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
- Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
- A difficulty with the command allocation mechanism
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
- Incentives, iterative communication, and organizational control
- An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Revelation of preferences for public goods: Aggregation by abelian operations
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Efficiency in partnerships
- A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
- Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Team decision theory and integral equations
- Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
- Profit-maximizing design of enterprises through incentives
- Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
- Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
- Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- The modified Vickrey double auction
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
- Pricing combinatorial auctions.
- Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- Manipulation through bribes
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Risk externalities: when financial imperfections are not the problem, but part of the solution
- Mechanism design for land acquisition
- Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good
- Reordering an existing queue
- A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints
- Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
- Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs
- Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games
- Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling
- A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
- Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- Fair imposition
- Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
- Models for bundle trading in financial markets
- Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations
- A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
- A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
- Incentive compatible regression learning
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
- Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
- Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- Efficient voting with penalties
- Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
- Nash-equilibrium algorithm and incentive protocol for a decentralized decision and scheduling problem in sustainable electroplating plants
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
- On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms
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