Risk externalities: when financial imperfections are not the problem, but part of the solution
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1669112
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.008zbMath1416.91251OpenAlexW2802458530MaRDI QIDQ1669112
Andrés Carvajal, Maria Arvaniti
Publication date: 30 August 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.008
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Pareto improving taxes
- Nash-Walras equilibria
- Generic existence of competitive equilibria with restricted participation
- Constrained suboptimality in incomplete markets: A general approach and two applications
- General equilibrium with endogenous securities and moral hazard
- On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
- The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium
- Incentives in Teams
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1
- Generic regularity of competitive equilibria with restricted participation
This page was built for publication: Risk externalities: when financial imperfections are not the problem, but part of the solution