Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1

DOI10.1093/restud/rdw015zbMath1405.91145OpenAlexW2243728696MaRDI QIDQ4610821

Martin F. Hellwig, Felix J. Bierbrauer

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw015

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designvoting mechanismspublic-good provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

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