Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4610821
DOI10.1093/restud/rdw015zbMath1405.91145MaRDI QIDQ4610821
Martin F. Hellwig, Felix J. Bierbrauer
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw015
Related Items
Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents, Information sharing in democratic mechanisms, Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision, Risk externalities: when financial imperfections are not the problem, but part of the solution, Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism, Robust coalitional implementation, Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices, All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision, On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget, Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement