Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
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Publication:2231396
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317zbMath1471.91185OpenAlexW3186765478MaRDI QIDQ2231396
Martin Hagen, Ángel Hernando-Veciana
Publication date: 29 September 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317
mechanism designbilateral tradedominant strategiescollusion-proofnessmultidimensional private informationposted prices
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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