Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

DOI10.1007/BF01213663zbMath0858.90007MaRDI QIDQ5916382

Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date: 23 March 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

one private good; one public good; semi-convex cost sharing; minimum demand principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies, Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges, Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects, Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies