Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2579zbMath0971.91014OpenAlexW2056740697MaRDI QIDQ1976440

Shigehiro Serizawa, Dolors Berga

Publication date: 24 October 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2579

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofconvex preferencesgeneralized median voter schemesminimally rich domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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