Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
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Publication:2431829
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0112-4zbMATH Open1180.91172OpenAlexW2089349773MaRDI QIDQ2431829FDOQ2431829
Authors: Hideyuki Mizobuchi, Shigehiro Serizawa 
Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13358
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Voting by Committees
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
Cited In (14)
- Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- Domains where the uniform rule is well behaved
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
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