Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
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Publication:2431829
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Cites work
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
- Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Voting by Committees
Cited in
(14)- Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
- Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
- Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- Domains where the uniform rule is well behaved
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences
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