Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00767-zzbMath1479.91156OpenAlexW3168186092MaRDI QIDQ2230551

Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Takuma Wakayama

Publication date: 24 September 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/52453

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalitystrategy-proofnesssingle-peaked preferencesenvy-freenessuniform rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

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