Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
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Publication:2386274
DOI10.1007/s003550050106zbMath1066.91507OpenAlexW2035658332MaRDI QIDQ2386274
Bettina Klaus, Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 22 August 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050106
Related Items (13)
The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints ⋮ Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Stable sharing ⋮ The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Allocation rules on networks ⋮ Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness ⋮ Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
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