Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0312-1zbMath1184.91134MaRDI QIDQ733774

Özgür Kıbrıs, Serkan Kucuksenel

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0312-1

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimality; anonymity; independence of trade volume; renegotiation proofness; voluntary trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B60: Trade models

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems, A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems, Allocation rules on networks, The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences, Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints

Cites Work

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