Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets
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Publication:733774
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0312-1zbMath1184.91134MaRDI QIDQ733774
Özgür Kıbrıs, Serkan Kucuksenel
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0312-1
Pareto optimality; anonymity; independence of trade volume; renegotiation proofness; voluntary trade
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B60: Trade models
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Cites Work
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