The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0991-yzbMath1392.91106OpenAlexW2516854385MaRDI QIDQ2361503

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak

Publication date: 30 June 2017

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0991-y

zbMATH Keywords

single-peaked preferencereplacement principleresource transfereconomy network

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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