The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0092-4MaRDI QIDQ2432491zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Youngsub Chun

Publication date 25 October 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0092-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

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• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• The replacement principle in economies with indivisible goods
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Cited in

(16)

• The separability principle in bargaining
• The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences
• Priority, solidarity and egalitarianism
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Distributional properties of the uniform rule in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Non-bossiness
• The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• A separation result for stationary preferences
• Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules
• One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule
• Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
• Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences

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