The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1311270
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(93)90169-DzbMath0782.90003OpenAlexW3123876248WikidataQ59972958 ScholiaQ59972958MaRDI QIDQ1311270
Publication date: 13 January 1994
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90169-d
Related Items
Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences, Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators, Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems, The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences, Strategy-proofness and ``median voters, Immunity to credible deviations from the truth, Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped, An efficient method to solve the strongly coupled nonlinear differential equations of impact dampers, A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains, Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules., A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population, Consistent representative democracy, Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences, Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain, The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences, The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks, Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations, Unfolding the mystery of false-name-proofness, The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions, Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities, Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle, Solidarity with respect to small changes in preferences in public good economies with single-peaked preferences, Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo, Non-bossiness, Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options, The replacement principle in bargaining, Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: a tale of two rules, Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo, Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria, Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice, Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains, The target location function on finite trees, A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model, The replacement principle and tree structured preferences, Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle, Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies, Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains, Generalized target functions on trees, Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
