The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions
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Publication:1966226
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00062-7zbMath0937.91042WikidataQ127207458 ScholiaQ127207458MaRDI QIDQ1966226
Fabrice Valognes, Donald G. Saari
Publication date: 1999
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (10)
IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Complexity and the geometry of voting ⋮ Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities ⋮ Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences ⋮ A diagram for analyzing ordinal voting systems ⋮ ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule ⋮ The profile structure for Luce's choice axiom ⋮ Pareto efficiency with spatial rights ⋮ On the probability of observing Borda's paradox ⋮ The scoring rules in an endogenous election
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- Basic Geometry of Voting
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