The likelihood of dubious election outcomes

DOI10.1007/s001990050258zbMath0918.90050OpenAlexW2006879301MaRDI QIDQ1285887

Donald G. Saari, Maria Tataru

Publication date: 10 June 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050258

zbMATH Keywords

paradoxescentral limit theoremvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (14)

Chaos, but in voting and apportionments? ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Complexity and the geometry of voting ⋮ Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities ⋮ The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions ⋮ On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner ⋮ The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes ⋮ On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules ⋮ Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes ⋮ On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives ⋮ On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules ⋮ Consequences of reversing preferences ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data ⋮ Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

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