On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules

DOI10.1007/S11238-009-9187-6MaRDI QIDQ993505zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin

Publication date 20 September 2010

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9187-6

zbMATH Keywords

impartial culture assumptioninstabilityscoring rulesself-selectivitystability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
• On stable rules for selecting committees
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity

Cites work

• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
• Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Geometry of voting
• Hyperbolic geometry: The first 150 years
• On probability models in voting theory
• On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles
• On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
• On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
• On the volume of hyperbolic polyhedra
• Self-selection consistent functions
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
• The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
• The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election
• The probability of ties with scoring methods: some results

Cited in

(8)

• Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency
• On stable rules for selecting committees
• An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
• Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
• On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
• Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes

This page was built for publication: On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q993505)