Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference

DOI10.1007/S003550000071MaRDI QIDQ2388796zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William V. Gehrlein, Fabrice Valognes

Publication date 20 September 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000071

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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(18)

• The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
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• The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
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• On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
• The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
• Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates
• Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?
• On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives
• On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
• The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
• A new formulation of the principle of indifference
• Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
• Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
• The uncovered set and indifference in spatial models: a fuzzy set approach

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