Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90093-XzbMATH Open1273.91135OpenAlexW2034724353WikidataQ126401546 ScholiaQ126401546MaRDI QIDQ373790FDOQ373790

Authors: William V. Gehrlein 

Publication date: 25 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90093-x

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation

Cited In (8)

• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
• On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies
• Condorcet efficiency, information costs, and the performance of scoring rules
• Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
• Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
• On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
• The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner

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