On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0665-3MaRDI QIDQ2452244zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Abhijit Chandra, Sunanda Roy

Publication date 2 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0665-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226093 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I: Pairwise votes
• Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
• The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach

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