Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
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Publication:2366925
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90245-TzbMath0772.90023OpenAlexW1965203662MaRDI QIDQ2366925
Publication date: 11 October 1993
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90245-t
Related Items (4)
The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis ⋮ Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
Cites Work
- Single-stage election procedures for large electorates
- Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
- The effect of social homogeneity on coincidence probabilities for pairwise proportional lottery and simple majority rules
- Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
- Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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