Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections

DOI10.1007/S11238-007-9063-1zbMATH Open1183.91045OpenAlexW1980518899MaRDI QIDQ1036097FDOQ1036097

Authors: Bernardo Moreno, M. Socorro Puy 

Publication date: 4 November 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9063-1

Recommendations

• The scoring rules in an endogenous election
• The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnerplurality rulesincere votingcitizen-candidate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• The scoring rules in an endogenous election

Cited In (5)

• Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
• Can the majority lose the election?
• The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
• Strategic voting and nomination
• The scoring rules in an endogenous election

This page was built for publication: Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1036097)