Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.016zbMath1414.91123OpenAlexW2762746213MaRDI QIDQ1682707

Mariam Arzumanyan, Mattias K. Polborn

Publication date: 5 December 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.016

zbMATH Keywords

costly votingendogenous participation models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (5)

Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ Electoral turnout with divided opposition ⋮ Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment. ⋮ Strategic voting when participation is costly ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting

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• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Univariate Discrete Distributions

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