Electoral turnout with divided opposition

DOI10.1007/S00355-022-01424-4MaRDI QIDQ6168802zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 11 July 2023

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01424-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Coordination and turnout in large elections
• Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation
• A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters
• Asymmetric partisan voter turnout games
• A model of electoral behaviour

Cites work

• Altruism and voting: a large-turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior
• Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Large Poisson games
• Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
• On the Measurement of Polarization
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
• Strategic voting when participation is costly
• Welfare reducing polls

Cited in

(8)

• Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
• Coordination and turnout in large elections
• An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens
• A test of the marginalist defense of the rational voter hypothesis using quantile regression
• Expressive voting and its cost: evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates
• Turnout and closeness: evidence from 60 years of Bavarian mayoral elections
• Razor-thin mass elections with high turnout
• Contest with attack and defense: Does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout?

This page was built for publication: Electoral turnout with divided opposition

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6168802)