Expressive voting and its cost: evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates

DOI10.3982/ECTA15373zbMATH Open1419.91259WikidataQ128972619 ScholiaQ128972619MaRDI QIDQ4644803FDOQ4644803

Authors: Vincent Pons, Clémence Tricaud 

Publication date: 9 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingregression discontinuity designexpressive votingFrench elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (8)

• A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives
• Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
• ELECTORAL MALDISTRICTING
• Majority judgment vs. approval voting
• The expressive power of voting rules
• Costly expressive voting

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