Expressive voting and its cost: evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates

DOI10.3982/ECTA15373MaRDI QIDQ4644803zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Vincent Pons, Clémence Tricaud

Publication date 9 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA15373

zbMATH Keywords

expressive votingFrench electionsregression discontinuity designstrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
• Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
• Electoral turnout with divided opposition
• Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting

Cited in

(11)

• Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives
• Majority judgment vs. approval voting
• ELECTORAL MALDISTRICTING
• Costly expressive voting
• The expressive power of voting rules
• Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
• Unfounded opinion's curse
• A unified test for regression discontinuity designs
• Random votes to parties and policies in coalition governments

This page was built for publication: Expressive voting and its cost: evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4644803)