Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.06.025zbMATH Open1396.91132OpenAlexW2694449796MaRDI QIDQ1782341FDOQ1782341

Authors: Anna Lo Prete, Federico Revelli 

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.est.unito.it/do/home.pl/Download?doc=/allegati/wp2017dip/wp_25_2017.pdf

Recommendations

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• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?

zbMATH Keywords

ideologyvalencevoter turnoutvoting cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?

Cited In (5)

• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
• Cost-conscious voters in referendum elections
• Expressive voting and its cost: evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates
• On the Distortion Value of Elections with Abstention
• Costly expressive voting

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