Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0344-6zbMATH Open1183.91043OpenAlexW1976944491MaRDI QIDQ734044FDOQ734044

Sayantan Ghosal, Ben Lockwood

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0344-6

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zbMATH Keywords

voluntary votingcompulsory votingheterogeneous informationPareto-rankingprivate preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Information acquisition in committees
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries

Cited In (11)

• Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
• Participation in fraudulent elections
• The political (in)stability of funded social security
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
• Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections
• Civic duty and political advertising
• Large elections and interim turnout
• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• On the consensus effect
• The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting

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