Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0344-6zbMath1183.91043MaRDI QIDQ734044

Sayantan Ghosal, Ben Lockwood

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0344-6

zbMATH Keywords

voluntary voting; compulsory voting; heterogeneous information; Pareto-ranking; private preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

91B44: Economics of information

91B08: Individual preferences

Related Items

Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections, A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs, Voluntary voting: costs and benefits, An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly, Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence, Civic duty and political advertising, The political (in)stability of funded social security, On the consensus effect, The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting, Participation in fraudulent elections, Large elections and interim turnout

Cites Work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Information acquisition in committees
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information