Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
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Publication:734044
DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0344-6zbMath1183.91043OpenAlexW1976944491MaRDI QIDQ734044
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0344-6
Related Items (11)
Participation in fraudulent elections ⋮ A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs ⋮ The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting ⋮ Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly ⋮ Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ Civic duty and political advertising ⋮ Voluntary voting: costs and benefits ⋮ Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence ⋮ The political (in)stability of funded social security ⋮ On the consensus effect
Cites Work
- A Bayesian model of voting in juries
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Information acquisition in committees
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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