The electoral college, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting

DOI10.1007/S00355-018-1128-2MaRDI QIDQ2417375zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrew D. Jorgenson, Martin Saavedra

Publication date 12 June 2019

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1128-2

zbMATH Keywords

battleground districtselectoral collegepartisan districtsvoter turnout model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
• Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections

Cited in

(3)

• The longer-term electoral effect of carrying a state in U.S. presidential elections
• A modified ``winner-take-all rule for awarding state electoral votes in US presidential elections and a game model for its analysis
• Turnout and closeness: evidence from 60 years of Bavarian mayoral elections

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